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REVIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN IRAQ:
KEY PROVISIONS OF THE
TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
HIS EXCELLENCY FEISAL AMIN AL-ISTRABADI*
Iraq has had a troubled constitutional history.  Its only legiti-
mate, permanent constitution came into effect in 1925, having
been drafted during the British mandate established at the end of
the First World War.1  On October 3, 1932, Iraq was admitted to the
League of Nations as an independent state, the first predominantly
Arab state to gain its independence, thus ending the British Man-
date.2  The Constitution of 1925, as amended, remained in full
force and effect until 1958.
On July 14, 1958, a coup d’e´tat overthrew the monarchy, after
which Iraq was ruled under a series of so-called provisional constitu-
tions.  The new military government decreed the Provisional Con-
stitution of 1958, which was followed by the Provisional
Constitution of 1964, itself decreed after yet another coup.  The
coup of 1968 brought the previous regime to power, and it decreed
two provisional constitutions, that of 1968, followed by the Provi-
sional Constitution of 1970.  This last “provisional” constitution was
in effect (at least theoretically) for thirty-three years, until April
2003, matching exactly the amount of time Iraq’s only permanent
(and legitimate) constitution was in effect.
* The author is Ambassador and Alternate Permanent Representative of Iraq to
the United Nations.  He was one of the principal legal drafters of the Iraq Transitional
Administrative Law and was the principal author of its bill of rights.  This article was
originally delivered as a C.V. Starr Lecture at New York Law School in New York City on
February 23, 2005.  The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not
necessarily represent those of the Government of Iraq.
1. The 1925 Constitution was debated and ratified by an elected Constituent As-
sembly. PHILIP W. IRELAND, IRAQ:  A STUDY IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 393 (1938). It
was thus a genuinely legitimate document.  Its ratification, however, was by no means
assured.  Despite British pressure, the final vote for ratification was thirty-seven to
twenty-four with eight abstentions. Id. at 404.  This author’s grandfather, Mahmoud al-
Istrabadi, was a member of the Constituent Assembly.
2. SYDNEY NETTLETON FISHER & WILLIAM OCHSENWALD, THE MIDDLE EAST:  A HIS-
TORY 425 (4th ed. 1990).
269
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From 1958, then, until 2003, Iraq was governed at any given
time by the caprice of a single man.  Constitutionalism had so re-
ceded during this time that the concept of constitutionalism itself
had entirely disappeared.  Forty-five years of tinkering with succes-
sive constitutions — whether directly through the promulgation of
new constitutions or through amendments — had thoroughly un-
dermined any commitment to constitutionalism or the rule of law.
For instance, a former professor of constitutional law at the Univer-
sity of Baghdad proposed a constitution for Iraq (immediately prior
to the fall of the previous regime) in which a typical passage stated:
“The trial of an accused shall be public unless a judge orders other-
wise.”  Laws, statutes, and judicial discretion could each supersede
even constitutional “guarantees.”
The foregoing history provides a backdrop not only to Iraq’s
constitutional history, but also to the decision of the Iraqi Gov-
erning Council (IGC) not to call the Law of Administration for the
State of Iraq for the Transitional Period3 (TAL) an interim or provi-
sional constitution.  Too many provisional constitutions had been
promulgated in recent memory and “provisional” constitutions had
a tendency to become permanent in Iraq.  Furthermore, under Se-
curity Council Resolution 1483, nothing became law in Iraq unless
it was signed by U.S. Ambassador L. Paul Bremmer, the civil admin-
istrator of Iraq.4  It was the Civil Administrator, not the IGC, who
had the power to legislate.5  No Iraqi wanted the American Civil
Administrator to sign a document called an Iraqi constitution.
Thus the rather cumbersome title for what in fact is Iraq’s interim
constitution.
As some commentators have noted, a principle in international
humanitarian law is that an occupier may not tinker with an occu-
pied country’s legal system except to the extent necessary to defend
3. Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (Mar.
8, 2004) [hereinafter TAL], available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/government/
TAL.html.
4. The grant of power by the Security Council to the civil administrator was
sweeping.  The author remembers one of Bremmer’s deputies very early on, in June of
2003, in Baghdad saying to him, “The powers the Security Council gave us are mind-
boggling.”
5. See S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4761st mtg., at 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1483 (2003).
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the occupier’s troops.6  Resolution 1483 derogated this principle by
giving sweeping powers to the Civil Administrator,7 though doing
so had the effect of turning the liberation of Iraq into a de jure occu-
pation.  A sovereign Iraqi government should have been an-
nounced immediately after the liberation of Baghdad, but that is
not what happened.  In any event, the IGC had to deal practically
with the legal posture in which it found itself.
There was early agreement by the IGC members that the TAL
would be promulgated by consensus.  In order to achieve consensus
political compromises were required of all IGC Members, but none
of the twenty-five members of the Governing Council was asked to
make a compromise on principle.  On March 8, 2004, all twenty-five
members of the Governing Council, representing parties ranging
from the Communist Party to the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq, signed the TAL, which had been previously ap-
proved by consensus.8
Generally speaking, the TAL is a very liberal, forward-looking
document.9  It is in many respects an exhortatory document, rather
6. See, e.g., Jamal Benomar, Constitution-Making after Conflict:  Lessons for Iraq, 15 J.
DEMOCRACY 81, 93 (2004) (in playing a major role in drafting an Iraqi interim constitu-
tion “the CPA went beyond its obligations as an occupying authority under interna-
tional humanitarian law”); Peter W. Galbraith, Iraq:  The Bungled Transition, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Sept. 23, 2004, at 71 (“Occupying powers cannot . . . make permanent law.
Thus all law made by the [CPA] expired when the occupation ended on June 28
[2004].”), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/article-preview?article_id=
17406.  One year later, Galbraith was singing a different tune, taking the provisions of
the TAL quite seriously, particularly those provisions dealing with ratification of the
permanent constitution. See Peter W. Galbraith, Iraq:  Bush’s Islamic Republic, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Aug. 11, 2005, at 6-9, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18150. See
also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Prosecuting Saddam Hussein, FOREIGN POLICY, July 2005, availa-
ble at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3120.
7. See S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 5, ¶ 8 (granting the civil administrator, in con-
sultation with Iraqi and UN representatives, the power “to restore and establish national
and local institutions” of government, and to facilitate re-construction of key infrastruc-
ture; promote human rights and economic reconstruction, through “coordination with
national and regional organizations . . . civil society, donors, and international financial
institutions,” and encourage basic civil administration, legal and judicial reform, and
rebuilding police capacity).
8. See S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 5, at 9.  Ambassador Bremmer also had to con- R
sent to the agreement as required by the Security Council’s resolution. Id.
9. Cf. Statement by President, George W. Bush (Mar. 8, 2004), available at http:/
/www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20040308_Bush_TAL.html.  President Bush described it
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than a descriptive one,10 as the current situation in Iraq is far from
the idyllic place described in the TAL.  This fact is clear even from
the Preamble,11 one of the last sections written.  The Preamble is
aspirational in its rejection of violence, its reassertion of the sover-
eignty of the people of Iraq, its determination to commit Iraq to
adherence to international law, and its attempt to reclaim Iraq’s
rightful place amongst the family of civilized nations.  Chapter
One,12 Fundamental Principles, Article 1(C) specifically incorpo-
rated the Preamble as an integral part of the TAL.13  Interestingly,
as a “historic milestone in the Iraqi people’s long journey from tyranny and violence to
liberty and peace.” Id.
10. See LARRY DIAMOND, SQUANDERED VICTORY:  THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION AND
THE BUNGLED EFFORT TO BRING DEMOCRACY TO IRAQ 177 (2005).  Dr. Adnan Pachachi,
in many ways the true father of, and driving force behind the TAL certainly in its liberal
outlook, stated in the press conference held to unveil the TAL:
Some may say that the Bill of Rights is copied from the West.  My answer:
These rights and values are not exclusively the property of the West; they
are universal and should be respected and implemented everywhere.  This
law is aspirational in character.  We have not legislated for the present, but
we have put up a high standard so that the people in the future will always
try to reach [it].  It is thus a beacon of light and hope for future
generations.
Dr. Adnan Pachachi, Remarks by Members of the Iraqi Governing Council at Signing
Ceremony for the Interim Constitution, Baghdad, Iraq (Mar. 8, 2004), available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/transcripts/20040308_signing_transcript.html.
11. TAL, supra note 3, preamble, declaring that:
The people of Iraq, striving to reclaim their freedom, which was usurped by
the previous tyrannical regime, rejecting violence and coercion in all their
forms, and particularly when used as instruments of governance, have de-
termined that they shall hereafter remain a free people governed under the
rule of law.
These people, affirming today their respect for international law, especially
having been amongst the founders of the United Nations, working to re-
claim their legitimate place among nations, have endeavored at the same
time to preserve the unity of their homeland in a spirit of fraternity and
solidarity in order to draw the features of the future new Iraq, and to estab-
lish the mechanisms aiming, amongst other aims, to erase the effects of
racist and sectarian policies and practices.
This Law is now established to govern the affairs of Iraq during the transi-
tional period until a duly elected government, operating under a perma-
nent and legitimate constitution achieving full democracy, shall come into
being.
12. TAL, supra note 3, arts. 1-9.
13. Id. at art. 1(C) (stating that “[t]he Preamble to this Law is an integral part of
this Law.”).
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it was the Shi’a religious parties, who subsequently achieved an im-
pressive win in the elections,14 which insisted on Article 1(C).
The issue of gender was front and center during the negotia-
tion of the TAL.  Article 1(B) states that gender-specific language
shall apply equally to men and women.15  Of course, there is a well-
known principle of legal writing that the use of a masculine pro-
noun includes the female.  Nevertheless, the Governing Council
wanted to make it clear from the beginning that there could not be
any basis for gender discrimination with respect to the use of the
male pronoun.  Given that religious parties now have a solid major-
ity in the National Assembly, it remains to be seen whether this pro-
vision will survive without exceptions.
In Article 2 the transitional period was divided into two
phases.16  In phase one, authority was vested in a sovereign Interim
14. See Jason Keyser, Shiites Dominate Iraq Elections; Kurds 2nd (Feb. 13, 2005), avail-
able at: http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=495492. The January 2005
elections resulted in a coalition of Shiite religious parties controlling more than half
the seats of the National Assembly, while a coalition of Kurdish parties controlled
slightly more than one-quarter of the seats.  The outgoing interim prime minister’s
party controlled some 13% of the seats.
15. TAL, supra note 3, art. 1(B).
16. See id. at art. 2, providing that:
(A) The term “transitional period” shall refer to the period beginning on
30 June 2004 and lasting until the formation of an elected Iraqi govern-
ment pursuant to a permanent constitution as set forth in this Law, which
in any case shall be no later than 31 December 2005, unless the provisions
of Article 61 are applied.
(B) The transitional period shall consist of two phases.
(1) The first phase shall begin with the formation of a fully sovereign
Iraqi Interim Government that takes power on 30 June 2004.  This gov-
ernment shall be constituted in accordance with a process of extensive
deliberations and consultations with cross-sections of the Iraqi people
conducted by the Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Au-
thority and possibly in consultation with the United Nations.  This gov-
ernment shall exercise authority in accordance with this Law, including
the fundamental principles and rights specified herein, and with an an-
nex that shall be agreed upon and issued before the beginning of the
transitional period and that shall be an integral part of this Law.
(2) The second phase shall begin after the formation of the Iraqi Transi-
tional Government, which will take place after elections for the National
Assembly have been held as stipulated in this Law, provided that, if pos-
sible, these elections are not delayed beyond 31 December 2004, and, in
any event, beyond 31 January 2005.  This second phase shall end upon
the formation of an Iraqi government pursuant to a permanent
constitution.
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Government appointed by the CPA in consultation with the U.N.
Secretary-General’s Special Representative.  In phase two, authority
was vested in a Transitional Government for which elections were
to be held in January 2005.17  When discussing the transfer of
power to the Interim Government created by the TAL, the media
generally, but mistakenly, referred to a transfer of sovereignty.  The
United States and the CPA were never sovereign in Iraq.  Admit-
tedly, Iraq’s sovereignty was dormant for a time, but Ambassador
Bremmer could not transfer sovereignty back to the Iraqis.  It was a
transfer of authority.
Article 3 makes clear that, regardless of nomenclature, the
TAL is in fact an interim constitution in all but name.18  Article
3(A) makes the TAL the supreme law of Iraq, superseding any legis-
lation.  Underscoring that the document is truly provisional in na-
ture, Article 3(C) provides that the TAL “shall cease to have effect
upon the formation of an elected government pursuant to a perma-
nent constitution.”  Other provisions also underscore that the TAL,
despite its name, operates as a constitution.  The TAL, for instance,
establishes the relationship between legislation passed by the Fed-
eral Legislature and legislation from other governmental units,
mandating that federal legislation supersede any legislation from
other governmental units.19  There is one notable exception.  The
Kurdistan Regional Government may “amend the application” of
17. See Keyser, supra note 14 (discussing the election results).
18. See TAL, supra note 3, art. 3.
(A) This Law is the Supreme Law of the land and shall be binding in all
parts of Iraq without exception.  No amendment to this Law may be made
except by a three-fourths majority of the members of the National Assembly
and the unanimous approval of the Presidency Council.  Likewise, no
amendment may be made that could abridge in any way the rights of the
Iraqi people cited in Chapter Two; extend the transitional period beyond
the timeframe cited in this Law; delay the holding of elections to a new
assembly; reduce the powers of the regions or governorates; or affect Islam,
or any other religions or sects and their rites.
(B) Any legal provision that conflicts with this Law is null and void.
(C) This Law shall cease to have effect upon the formation of an elected
government pursuant to a permanent constitution.
19. Id. at art. 26(B) (providing that “[l]egislation issued by the federal legislative
authority shall supersede any other legislation issued by any other legislative authority
in the event that they contradict each other, except as provided in Article 54(B)”).
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federal legislation when the National Assembly legislates in matters
outside its exclusive competence.20
The IGC broke new ground with Article 4, truly making his-
tory.21  Iraq was declared a federal, democratic,22 and pluralistic re-
public.  It was relatively rare for a centralized state, which had
always existed as such, to devolve to a federal governmental sys-
tem.23  By contrast, when the United States was formed, thirteen
sovereign states (which had previously been thirteen separate
Crown colonies) voluntarily coalesced to form a federal govern-
mental structure with a strong central government, but with State
governments that also had a tremendous residuum of power.
There is a similar example of this phenomenon in the Arab world:
Six — later joined by the seventh — independent Trucial States
formed the federal United Arab Emirates in 1971.24
Iraq is now in the process of doing precisely the opposite; it is
taking a highly centralized state and creating a federated, multi-
tiered structure.  Iraq’s extremely centralized governmental system
20. See id. at art. 54(B), stating that:
With regard to the application of federal laws in the Kurdistan region, the
Kurdistan National Assembly shall be permitted to amend the application
of any such law within the Kurdistan region, but only to the extent that this
relates to matters that are not within the provisions of Articles 25 and 43(D)
of this Law and that fall within the exclusive competence of the federal
government.
21. See id. at art. 4, stating that:
The system of government in Iraq shall be republican, federal, democratic,
and pluralistic, and powers shall be shared between the federal government
and the regional governments, governorates, municipalities, and local ad-
ministrations.  The federal system shall be based upon geographic and his-
torical realities and the separation of powers, and not upon origin, race,
ethnicity, nationality, or confession.
22. There was one objection to the use of the word “democratic.”  A representa-
tive of a religious party wanted to say instead “democratic methods,” rather than “demo-
cratic,” believing democracy as such implied western secularism.  No other IGC
representative took up the objection, and the objection was effectively withdrawn.
23. Belgium is certainly an exception, as its current Constitution creates a feder-
ated monarchy, perhaps an example for Iraqi royalists. (1994) BELG. CONST. art. 1,
available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/be00000_.html#A001.
24. See U.A.E. CONST. art. 1 (amended 1996), available at http://www.uae.gov.ae/
moca/dostur/1/1.htm; United Nations Development Program, Program on Govern-
ance in the Arab Region: Constitution: United Arab Emirates, available at http://www.
pogar.org/countries/constitution.asp?cid=21 (stating that the Provisional Constitution
of 1971 became permanent in 1996).
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is probably due to the strong historical influence of France preva-
lent throughout the Middle East.  For instance, every custodian in
every elementary school, in every village, was appointed by the or-
der of the Ministry of Education in Baghdad.  The adoption of the
TAL represents a break from this centralized system to an aspira-
tion to genuine federalism.  The success or failure of Iraq as a state
will hinge, to a considerable extent, on the ability of Iraq to flourish
as a federation.
One of the most contentious issues encountered in drafting
the TAL was the role of religion in Iraq’s constitutional and legal
life.  Article 7(A) dealt with the issue, but it will undoubtedly be
revisited when a permanent constitution is drafted.  The final text
of Article 7(A) states that “Islam is the official religion of the State
and is to be considered a source of legislation.”25  The Governing
Council spent weeks considering whether Islam was “the source of
legislation,” “the principal source of legislation,” “a principal source
amongst other principal sources,” or “a source amongst other
sources of legislation.”  Each of these views was offered and found a
sponsor.26
Late in the negotiations, after the IGC had agreed that Islam
would be a principle source of legislation amongst other principle
sources, some of the religious parties reneged on the agreement,
re-opening negotiations by demanding the excision of the phrase
“amongst other principle sources,” so that Islam would be the only
principle source.  At this juncture, an opposing view emerged from
the liberal side that, consistent with Iraq’s prior constitutional his-
tory, Article 7(A) should end upon declaring Islam the official state
religion.  In each of Iraq’s prior constitutions,27 the texts typically
25. TAL, supra note 3, art. 7(A) (emphasis added).  Note that it is Islam that is a
source of law, not the Sharicah (Islamic) law, which is a much narrower concept.
26. These details, and those which follow, about the negotiations on the issue of
the role of Islam, are within the author’s direct knowledge, as he became one of the
principal interlocutors on behalf of the liberal parties on the issue.
27. Translations of the text of Iraq’s previous constitutions used in this article are
those of the author based on the Arabic text as printed in INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
INST., DEPAUL UNIV. COLL. OF LAW IN COOPERATION WITH THE NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST.,
Al-Dasaˆtıˆr al-cIraqiyyah wa Muqaˆranah bi Macaˆyıˆr al-Distuˆrıˆyyah al-Dawlˆıyyah [The Iraqi
Constitutions and Comparative Studies with Int’l Human Rights Standards] (Boyd
Printing 2005) [hereinafter THE IRAQI CONSTITUTIONS], available at http://www.
law.depaul.edu/institutes_centers/ihrli/publications/iraqi_constitutions_2/.
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stated no more than that Islam was the official religion of the
state.28  Proponents of this view argued that, since it was not an
elected body, the Governing Council had insufficient legitimacy to
overturn nearly eighty years of Iraqi constitutional precedent.  It ap-
peared that the IGC would deadlock on this point, with each of the
two sides telling the other that any compromise would be a “deal
breaker.”
As time went on, the religious parties dropped their demand
that Islam should be the principle source, and agreed that it would
be “a source of legislation,” the language now in the TAL.  But their
agreement was hinged on other language prohibiting laws which
contradicted Islam, the spirit of Islam, the universally agreed tenets
of Islam, or some other similar formulary.  This demand tied the
Council up for hours on the night the TAL was being passed.  Fi-
nally, Dr. Pachachi, chairman of the drafting committee, fashioned
the compromise formula that broke the deadlock:  “No law that
contradicts the universally agreed tenets of Islam, the principles of
democracy, or the rights cited in Chapter Two of this Law may be
enacted during the transitional period.”29
Without doubt, Article 9 is an extremely important constitu-
tional development, not only in Iraq and the Arab world, but
throughout the Middle East.  Iraq may well be the first Middle East-
ern country to recognize more than one language as an official lan-
guage throughout the country.  The Kurds represent between
fifteen and twenty percent of Iraq’s population and Kurdish has al-
ways been an official language in the Kurdish regions of Iraq.30
28. See BASIC LAW OF THE KINGDOM OF IRAQ art 13 (1925), reprinted in THE IRAQI
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 27, at 10; IRAQ PROVISIONAL CONST. art. 4 (1958), reprinted in
THE IRAQI CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 27, at 57; IRAQ PROVISIONAL CONST. art. 3 (1964),
reprinted in THE IRAQI CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 27, at 65 (adding that Islam formed
the principle basis of the Constitution); IRAQ PROVISIONAL CONST. 1968 art. 4, reprinted
in THE IRAQI CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 27, at 82 (adding same language as the IRAQ
PROVISIONAL CONST of 1964, though Article 27(B) also added that the Islamic Sharicah
would govern inheritance law); IRAQ PROVISIONAL CONST. art. 4 (1970), reprinted in THE
IRAQI CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 27, at 101 (restoring language of 1925 and 1958); IRAQ
PROPOSED CONSTITUTION art. 5 (1990), reprinted in THE IRAQI CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
27, at 124 (this was a proposed permanent constitution, but it was never promulgated).
29. TAL, supra note 3, art. 7(A). See supra note 27.
30. TAL, supra note 3, art. 9, providing that:
The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two official lan-
guages of Iraq.  The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their
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Now, thanks to Article 9, it is an official language throughout Iraq.
It is interesting to note that, shortly after the governing council en-
acted this law, some Kurds in neighboring states began to demand
their linguistic and other human rights.31   Kurdish members of the
Iraqi Government, particularly in the National Assembly, have al-
ready spoken in Kurdish.32  It is likely that placing the Kurdish and
Arabic languages on an equal footing throughout Iraq will be an
essential component of making Iraq into a re-integrated whole.
Chapter Two of the TAL contains the Bill of Fundamental
Rights.33  Recalling that, prior to the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the Bill of Rights applied
only to the federal government of the United States, the drafters of
the TAL felt it was important that the rights enumerated in Chapter
Two clearly apply to all governmental entities.  Accordingly, Article
10 expressly applied the protections of Chapter Two not only to the
Transitional Government, but to regional governments, governor-
ates, municipalities, and localities.34  Although the plural was used,
mother tongue, such as Turcoman, Syriac, or Armenian, in government
educational institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in
any other language in private educational institutions, shall be guaranteed.
The scope of the term “official language” and the means of applying the
provisions of this Article shall be defined by law and shall include:
(1) Publication of the official gazette, in the two languages;
(2) Speech and expression in official settings, such as the National As-
sembly, the Council of Ministers, courts, and official conferences, in ei-
ther of the two languages;
(3) Recognition and publication of official documents and correspon-
dence in the two languages;
(4) Opening schools that teach in the two languages, in accordance with
educational guidelines;
(5) Use of both languages in any other settings enjoined by the princi-
ple of equality (such as bank notes, passports, and stamps);
(6) Use of both languages in the federal institutions and agencies in the
Kurdistan region.
31. See Neil MacFarquhar, Gains by Kin in Iraq Inflame Kurds’ Anger at Syria, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 2004, at A3.
32. DIAMOND, supra note 10, at 177.  The leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party
and IGC Member Masoud Barzani wasted no time in doing so, speaking in Kurdish at
the press conference announcing the TAL, he stated, “This is the first time we Kurds
feel that we are citizens of Iraq.”
33. TAL, supra note 3, arts. 10-23.
34. See id. at art. 10, stating that:
As an expression of the free will and sovereignty of the Iraqi people, their
representatives shall form the governmental structures of the State of Iraq.
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the Kurdistan Regional Government was, at the time of drafting,
the only regional government in Iraq.  However unlikely, it was pos-
sible that other regional governments could be formed during the
transitional period,35 and the drafters wanted no ambiguity regard-
ing the universal applicability of the Bill of Fundamental Rights.  In
any event, all governmental units and officials are included within
the ambit of the civil rights protections contained in Chapter Two.
Article 11 was the most widely debated, hotly contested, and
rewritten article in Chapter Two.  It is different in its essence from
the text originally proposed by this author.  Its fundamental pur-
pose was universally agreed upon: to ensure that Iraqis who had
been stripped of their citizenship on a capricious or arbitrary basis
by the previous regime — based on their nationality, their religion,
or their political views, for instance — would have their status as
nationals restored.36  While the original text submitted by this au-
thor to accomplish this goal was much broader, the issue of the
The Iraqi Transitional Government and the governments of the regions,
governorates, municipalities, and local administrations shall respect the
rights of the Iraqi people, including those rights cited in this Chapter.
35. See id. at art. 53(C), providing that:
Any group of no more than three governorates outside the Kurdistan re-
gion, with the exception of Baghdad and Kirkuk, shall have the right to
form regions from amongst themselves.  The mechanisms for forming such
regions may be proposed by the Iraqi Interim Government, and shall be
presented and considered by the elected National Assembly for enactment
into law.  In addition to being approved by the National Assembly, any legis-
lation proposing the formation of a particular region must be approved in a
referendum of the people of the relevant governorates.
36. Id. at art. 11, stating that:
(A) Anyone who carries Iraqi nationality shall be deemed an Iraqi citizen.
His citizenship shall grant him all the rights and duties stipulated in this
Law and shall be the basis of his relation to the homeland and the State.
(B) No Iraqi may have his Iraqi citizenship withdrawn or be exiled unless
he is a naturalized citizen who, in his application for citizenship, as estab-
lished in a court of law, made material falsifications on the basis of which
citizenship was granted.
(C) Each Iraqi shall have the right to carry more than one citizenship.  Any
Iraqi whose citizenship was withdrawn because he acquired another citizen-
ship shall be deemed an Iraqi.
(D) Any Iraqi whose Iraqi citizenship was withdrawn for political, religious,
racial, or sectarian reasons has the right to reclaim his Iraqi citizenship.
(E) Decision Number 666 (1980) of the dissolved Revolutionary Command
Council is annulled, and anyone whose citizenship was withdrawn on the
basis of this decree shall be deemed an Iraqi.
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treatment of Iraq’s expatriate Jews who had Israeli citizenship
caused the IGC to make the changes which ultimately resulted in
Article 11 as it now stands.
Yet for all the flaws in its final version, Article 11 remains a
hopeful illustration of the IGC’s attempt to revive constitutionalism
in Iraq.  The first sentence of Article 11(A) and the last sentence of
Article 11(C) each contain the phrase “shall be deemed an Iraqi
citizen.”37  The issue arose as to how a person could establish that
he should be “deemed” a citizen.  Some IGC members argued that
individuals should have to obtain an order from a minister of com-
petent jurisdiction, e.g., the Minister of Interior, in order to be
“deemed” citizens, and wanted Article 11 to so state.  The majority
understood that, citizenship being a fundamental right, no bureau-
cratic order was needed to establish a person’s “Iraqiness.”  No
Iraqi, after all, had to apply to a minister to establish that he had
the right of free speech.  By the same token, no Iraqi should need
to present to a functionary to establish his citizenship: It is the law
which deems him a citizen, not some bureaucrat.  Albeit perhaps a small
one, debating this issue — and its ultimate resolution — was an
important step on Iraq’s recovery of constitutionalism and the rule
of law.
The provisions in Article 11(B) barring withdrawal of citizen-
ship and exile of a natural-born Iraqi were also in response to Iraq’s
history dating from the early days of independence.  Article 7 of the
Constitution of 1925 also forbade deportation of Iraqi citizens,
coming as it did in response to the British practice of exile during
the Mandate.  In 1933, to evade the problem of the prohibition,
Parliament passed a law withdrawing the citizenship of members of
Iraq’s Assyrian community, allowing the government to deport
them, as they were no longer “citizens.”38  Thus Article 11(B) for-
bids both withdrawal of citizenship and exile.
Whether the civil rights protections of the TAL can be re-
garded as significant by a Western audience has been debated, and
(F) The National Assembly must issue laws pertaining to citizenship and
naturalization consistent with the provisions of this Law
(G) The Courts shall examine all disputes arising from the application of
the provisions relating to citizenship.
37. Id. at art. 11.
38. IRELAND, supra note 1, at 383.
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this author has been asked whether Chapter Two is “ordinary” or
“significant.”39  But the TAL is more than a copy of Western consti-
tutions.  One way of establishing the significance of the document
is to contrast gender rights as they are treated by the TAL with their
treatment in the text of the U.S. Constitution.  The American Con-
stitution does not contain a clear statement that male and female
citizens are equal.  The TAL does so in Article 12.40  Thus, all Iraqis
are equal before the law without regard to gender, sect, opinion,
belief, nationality, religion, or origin, and discrimination against an
Iraqi based upon these characteristics is prohibited.41  It is impor-
tant to contrast this language with the remaining clauses of Article
12, which state, respectively, “[e]very one” enjoys the rights to life,
liberty, and security of person; “[n]o one” can be deprived of such
rights without legal procedures; and “[a]ll” are equal before the
courts.  The general applicability of these principles beyond the
limiting word “Iraqis” was intentional.
Article 13 is fairly comprehensive, guaranteeing the rights to
free expression, association, including the right to unionize, and
free movement within Iraq and abroad.42  Section D of Article 13,
39. See, e.g., The News Hour with Jim Lehrer: Iraq Interim Constitution Signed (PBS tele-
vision broadcast Mar. 8, 2004), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-
june04/iraq_3-8.html (transcript of interview with Feisal Istrabadi.).
40. TAL, supra note 3, art. 12, stating that:
All Iraqis are equal in their rights without regard to gender, sect, opinion,
belief, nationality, religion, or origin, and they are equal before the law.
Discrimination against an Iraqi citizen on the basis of his gender, national-
ity, religion, or origin is prohibited.  Everyone has the right to life, liberty,
and the security of his person.  No one may be deprived of his life or lib-
erty, except in accordance with legal procedures.  All are equal before the
courts.
41. Id.
42. See id. at art. 13, stating:
(A) Public and private freedoms shall be protected.
(B) The right of free expression shall be protected.
(C) The right of free peaceable assembly and the right to join associations
freely, as well as the right to form and join unions and political parties
freely, in accordance with the law, shall be guaranteed.
(D) Each Iraqi has the right of free movement in all parts of Iraq and the
right to travel abroad and return freely.
(E) Each Iraqi has the right to demonstrate and strike peaceably in accor-
dance with the law.
(F) Each Iraqi has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and relig-
ious belief and practice.  Coercion in such matters shall be prohibited.
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guaranteeing the right of Iraqis to return to Iraq when traveling
abroad, was made in light of the practices of the previous regime.
Article 13(H) guarantees each Iraqi his right to privacy.43  It is inter-
esting to note that the one source of opposition to this right did not
come from any Iraqi party.  It came from the representatives of Am-
bassador Bremmer.  They argued that guaranteeing this right
would open the door to the controversy caused in America by Roe v.
Wade.44  This author responded that it would be a happy day, in-
deed, when abortion rights became the burning issue debated by
Iraqis.
Article 14 contains an interesting provision.  It states that the
individual, not the Iraqi, but the individual, has the right to security,
education, healthcare, and social security.45  The author was dis-
cussing this provision with the man who would later serve as Minis-
ter of Construction and Housing, Dr. Omar al-Damluji.  This
author expressed his skepticism about maintaining a nationalized
healthcare system, appearing as it did to be socialist in thought.  Dr.
al-Damluji replied:  How can the system now be dismantled, in light
of the large number of war widows, orphans, and amputees in Iraq,
some the victims of wars and some the victims of a barbaric system
of punishments for political crimes?  Further, free healthcare had
been enjoyed by Iraqi citizens for eighty years.  It made no sense to
try to chip away at these rights at precisely the moment of the peo-
ple’s greatest need given the economic situation in Iraq, and given
their anxiety about the transitional period.
(G) Slavery, the slave trade, forced labor, and involuntary servitude with or
without pay, shall be forbidden.
(H) Each Iraqi has the right to privacy.
43. Id. at art. 13(H)
44. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113 (1973) (holding that the state of Texas’s anti-
abortion statutes violated personal liberty rights under the Due Process Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, thereby causing significant political debate throughout the United
States).
45. TAL, supra note 3, art. 14, stating that:
The individual has the right to security, education, health care, and social
security.  The Iraqi State and its governmental units, including the federal
government, the regions, governorates, municipalities, and local adminis-
trations, within the limits of their resources and with due regard to other
vital needs, shall strive to provide prosperity and employment opportunities
to the people.
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In light of Iraq’s history, the drafters believed it essential to
deal extensively with the issue of the rights of the accused.  Article
1546 provides for various rights, mostly (though not exclusively) in
46. Id. at art. 15, providing that:
(A) No civil law shall have retroactive effect unless the law so stipulates.
There shall be neither a crime, nor punishment, except by law in effect at
the time the crime is committed.
(B) Police, investigators, or other governmental authorities may not violate
the sanctity of private residences, whether these authorities belong to the
federal or regional governments, governorates, municipalities, or local ad-
ministrations, unless a judge or investigating magistrate has issued a search
warrant in accordance with applicable law on the basis of information pro-
vided by a sworn individual who knew that bearing false witness would
render him liable to punishment.  Extreme exigent circumstances, as deter-
mined by a court of competent jurisdiction, may justify a warrantless search,
but such exigencies shall be narrowly construed.  In the event that a war-
rantless search is carried out in the absence of an extreme exigent circum-
stance, the evidence so seized, and any other evidence found derivatively
from such search, shall be inadmissible in connection with a criminal
charge, unless the court determines that the person who carried out the
warrantless search believed reasonably and in good faith that the search was
in accordance with the law.
(C) No one may be unlawfully arrested or detained, and no one may be
detained by reason of political or religious beliefs.
(D) All persons shall be guaranteed the right to a fair and public hearing by
an independent and impartial tribunal, regardless of whether the proceed-
ing is civil or criminal.  Notice of the proceeding and its legal basis must be
provided to the accused without delay.
(E) The accused is innocent until proven guilty pursuant to law, and he
likewise has the right to engage independent and competent counsel, to
remain silent in response to questions addressed to him with no compul-
sion to testify for any reason, to participate in preparing his defense, and to
summon and examine witnesses or to ask the judge to do so.  At the time a
person is arrested, he must be notified of these rights.
(F) The right to a fair, speedy, and open trial shall be guaranteed.
(G) Every person deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall have
the right of recourse to a court to determine the legality of his arrest or
detention without delay and to order his release if this occurred in an ille-
gal manner.
(H) After being found innocent of a charge, an accused may not be tried
once again on the same charge.
(I) Civilians may not be tried before a military tribunal.  Special or excep-
tional courts may not be established.
(J) Torture in all its forms, physical or mental, shall be prohibited under all
circumstances, as shall be cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.  No
confession made under compulsion, torture, or threat thereof shall be re-
lied upon or admitted into evidence for any reason in any proceeding,
whether criminal or otherwise.
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the criminal justice context, and most of its provisions sailed
through the IGC without any opposition.  Article 15(A) forbade ex
post facto laws.  The U.S. law of unreasonable search and seizure —
for all its flaws — informed the drafters in Article 15(B), requiring
a search warrant issued by a judge based on sworn evidence in all
but “extreme exigent circumstances,” and providing for an exclu-
sionary rule.  Article 15(C) barred arrest based solely on religious
or political belief.  While the International Covenant on Political
and Civil Rights requires that “a competent, independent and im-
partial tribunal” try an accused charged of a criminal violation,47
Article 15(D) of the TAL provides for a fair and impartial tribunal
in both criminal and civil proceedings.  It also requires adequate
notice of the proceedings as an indispensable element of due pro-
cess.48  Article 15(F) guarantees the rights to a speedy, open and
fair trial.49
Article 15(E) provides a comprehensive, fairly standard set of
rights for the accused.  For the first time in Iraq, and in a significant
departure from the inquisitorial format Iraq borrowed from
47. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
art. 14, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, Art. 14(1) [hereinafter CCPR], stating:
All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determi-
nation of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations
in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The
press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons
of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic
society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or
to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circum-
stances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; but any
judgement [sic] rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made
public except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or
the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of
children.
48. TAL, supra note 3, art. 15(D) (providing that “[a]ll persons shall be guaran-
teed the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal,
regardless of whether the proceedings is civil or criminal.  Notice of the proceeding and
its legal basis must be provided to the accused without delay”). See CCPR, supra note 47, R
art. 14(3)(a)(providing that everyone has the right to be informed in a language he
understands of the nature of the cause and charges against him).
49. TAL, supra note 3, art. 15(F) (providing that “[t]he right to a fair, speedy, and
open trial shall be guaranteed.”). See CCPR, supra note 47, art. 14(3)(c) (reserving the R
right to be tried without undue delay when faced with a criminal charge).
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France, a defendant now has the right to confront witnesses, and to
call or cause a judge to call witnesses.50  This Article now allows a
defense lawyer to call or require the judge to call defense witnesses
during the investigation.  Under the Iraqi Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, a “trial” in the Anglo-American sense of the word may, but
need not, take place, as it is the investigative phase which is crucial.
If the prosecutor elects not to call witnesses at the trial itself, the
trial judge may rely exclusively on the findings of the investigative
judge, hence the significance of the right to require an investigative
judge to call witnesses.  Pursuant to Article 15(E), in the event that
the prosecution does calls for witnesses during a trial, then the de-
fense may also call witnesses.
Article 15(G) guarantees the right of habeas corpus.  There is no
single, pithy phrase in Arabic to render the legal significance of
“habeas corpus” (nor, strictly speaking, is there one in English).  That
being the case, the drafters quoted verbatim the Arabic text of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights51 on the
subject.
Article 15(H) was extremely controversial.  Historically in Iraq,
a finding of not guilty by a judge did not bar further prosecution if
evidence was subsequently discovered.  Under the TAL, however,
once there has been an adjudication of innocence, a defendant can
expect that he will not be subject to repeated prosecution.  The bar
contained in Article 15(I) against trying civilians in military tribu-
nals was an innovation in Iraq, given Iraq’s experience with military
tribunals since 1958.  Recalling General Comment 13 to the
CCPR,52 15(I) also barred the establishment of other special or ex-
ceptional courts.  The previous regime had established a plethora
of special and exceptional courts, such as revolutionary courts, in
which proceedings were secret.
50. TAL, supra note 3, art. 15(E) (providing that “[t]he accused . . . has the right
to . . . summon and examine witnesses or to ask the judge to do so”). See CCPR, supra
note 47, art. 14(3)(e). R
51. See CCPR, supra note 47, art. 9(4). R
52. See U.N. High Comm’n on Human Rights, General Comment No. 13: Equality
before the Courts and the Right to a Fair and Public Hearing by an Independent Court Established
by Law (Art. 14), at 4, CCPR General Comment No. 13 (Apr. 13, 1984), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/bb722416a295f264c12563ed0049dfbd?
Opendocument.
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The last major provision in Article 15 is 15(J).  This Article con-
tained an absolute prohibition on torture.53  Here the American
interlocutors wanted an exception: a confession would still be ad-
missible if it could be shown that the evidence extracted by torture
could have been obtained without the tortured confession.  The
Iraqi drafters absolutely refused to include such an exception in the
TAL.
Iraq has a huge supply of small weapons — Iraqis are armed to
the teeth and a process of demobilization and disarmament is es-
sential when circumstances permit.  Hence, there is no second
amendment in the TAL, as there is to the U.S. Constitution.  In
fact, Article 17 explicitly prohibits anyone from possessing, bearing,
buying, or selling arms without licensure from the state.54  Given
the current state of affairs, this is an example of one of the TAL’s
aspirational articles.  It will likely take many years to control the
quantity of arms in Iraq.
Iraqis can be proud of Article 19.  It protects those granted
political asylum in Iraq.55  No political refugee may be surrendered
or returned forcibly to the country from which he fled, providing
he has obtained asylum in Iraq through legal proceedings.56  The
IGC did insist — quite reasonably — that, to qualify for the protec-
tions of this Article, the concerned individual should have obtained
asylum through legal proceedings.
The TAL contains an innovation in Article 20,57 at least as com-
pared to the U.S. Constitution.  Article 20(A) contain an express,
constitutional right to vote in Iraq, a right to stand for election, and
53. TAL, supra note 3, art. 15(J) (stating that “[t]orture in all its forms, physical or
mental, shall be prohibited under all circumstances”).
54. TAL, supra note 3, art. 17 (providing that “[i]t shall not be permitted to pos-
sess, bear, buy, or sell arms except on licensure issued in accordance with the law”).
55. Id. at art. 19 (providing that “no political refugee who has been granted asy-
lum pursuant to applicable law may be surrendered or returned forcibly to the country
from which he fled”).
56. Id.
57. Id. at art. 20, providing:
(A) Every Iraqi who fulfills the conditions stipulated in the electoral law has
the right to stand for election and cast his ballot secretly in free, open, fair,
competitive, and periodic elections.
(B) No Iraqi may be discriminated against for purposes of voting in elec-
tions on the basis of gender, religion, sect, race, belief, ethnic origin, lan-
guage, wealth, or literacy.
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to cast a ballot secretly in free, open, fair, competitive, and periodic
elections.58  Article 20(B) explicitly prohibits any discrimination in
the voting process based upon gender, religion, creed, and the
like.59  Literacy tests for voting are likewise prohibited.60
Article 21 operates to bar governmental interference with the
right of non-governmental organizations to develop civil society.61
But the background of this Article is interesting.  As originally
drafted, it prohibited governmental interference with development
of Iraqi NGO’s “whether in cooperation with foreign civil society or-
ganizations or otherwise.”62  A tremendous debate was engendered
in the IGC about this Article, and this author was truly shocked by
the negativity toward it.
Later, after contemplating the matter, Dr. Pachachi asked the
author to take out the word “foreign” and replace it with the word
“international.”  This author protested that the IGC was not having
a syntactical debate, but was consternated by the principle of foreign
NGO’s operating freely.  After something of a mildly heated discus-
sion, Dr. Pachachi finally stated, using the imperative mood, “Take
out ‘foreign’ and replace it with ‘international’!”  The author com-
plied.  The next day, the phrase “international civil society organi-
zations” was approved without debate.  The debate had been over
syntax after all.
Article 22 allows an individual — not necessarily a citizen — to
sue governmental officials, at all levels of government, for damages
arising out of a deprivation of constitutional or statutory rights.63
58. Id. at art. 20(A).
59. Id. at art. 20(B).
60. Id. at art. 20(B).
61. Id. at art. 21 (providing that “[n]either the Iraqi Transitional Government nor
the governments and administrations of the regions, governorates, and municipalities,
nor local administrations may interfere with the right of the Iraqi people to develop the
institutions of civil society, whether in cooperation with international civil society orga-
nizations or otherwise”).
62. The original draft of Article 21 is on file with the author (emphasis added).
63. TAL, supra note 3, art. 22, stating that:
If in the course of his work, an official of any government office, whether in
the federal government, the regional governments, the governorate and
municipal administrations, or the local administrations, deprives an individ-
ual or a group of the rights guaranteed by this Law or any other Iraqi laws
in force, this individual or group shall have the right to maintain a cause of
action against that employee to seek compensation for the damages caused
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Clearly, this Article borrowed from American law, enshrining 42
U.S.C. § 198364 into the TAL.  From the perspective of one steeped
in U.S. law, it may not sound terribly interesting to say that a person
may sue for damages in the event that his or her rights are with-
drawn or withheld wrongfully by a government official; however, for
a civil code country such as Iraq, this provision is innovative.  While
a person in a civil-code jurisdiction could always sue for injunctive
relief, damages are not typically recoverable against government of-
ficials.  Again the Americans proposed a good faith exception, a
suggestion which the Iraqi drafters rejected, preferring that the
matter be resolved by Iraqi courts.
The final Article of the Bill of Fundamental Rights was also
inspired by American law, specifically the Ninth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.65  Article 23 makes clear that the enumeration of
rights in Chapter Two is not an all-inclusive laundry list of the rights
inherent in the citizens of Iraq.66  Rather, Iraqis “enjoy all the rights
that befit a free people possessed of their human dignity,” includ-
by such deprivation, to vindicate his rights, and to seek any other legal mea-
sure.  If the court decides that the official had acted with a sufficient degree
of good faith and in the belief that his actions were consistent with the law,
then he is not required to pay compensation.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, in-
junctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated
or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (providing that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitu-
tion of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people”).
66. See TAL, supra note 3, art. 23, providing that:
The enumeration of the foregoing rights must not be interpreted to mean
that they are the only rights enjoyed by the Iraqi people.  They enjoy all the
rights that befit a free people possessed of their human dignity, including
the rights stipulated in international treaties and agreements, other instru-
ments of international law that Iraq has signed and to which it has acceded,
and others that are deemed binding upon it, and in the law of nations.
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ing the rights existing in international human rights treaties and
the law of nations which binds Iraq.67  Non-Iraqi citizens, while ob-
viously not enjoying all the rights reserved for Iraqis (e.g., the right
to vote), are guaranteed, nonetheless, protections of all “human
rights not inconsistent with their status as non-citizens.”68
The unambiguous intent of Article 23 was, obviously, to ex-
pand the scope of human rights protections in Iraq by encompass-
ing all the human rights treaties ratified by Iraq — and Iraq has
ratified virtually all — but without mentioning any of them by
name.  This author feared that the mention of specific treaties, par-
ticularly treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),69 would cause
endless debate and ultimately result in the Article failing to gain
approval.  Silence in this case was indeed golden.  Only one individ-
ual, representing one of the religious parties, objected that such
treaties had been ratified by the previous regime and should not be
binding.  No other IGC representative took up that cause, and the
objection died.
Chapter Three of the TAL, entitled “The Iraqi Transitional
Government,” contained general provisions relating to the newly-
created Federal Government in Baghdad.70  Article 24(C) denied
immunity to officials and employees of the Federal Government for
crimes committed while in office.71  This provision was an impor-
tant derogation and rejection of the Provisional Constitution of
1970, which contained an immunity provision for members of the
Revolutionary Command Council.72  The drafters wanted to make
Non-Iraqis within Iraq shall enjoy all human rights not inconsistent with
their status as non-citizens.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See infra note 91.
70. See id. at arts. 24-34.
71. Id. at art. 24(C) (providing that “[n]o official or employee of the Iraqi Transi-
tional Government shall enjoy immunity for criminal acts committed while in office”).
72. See IRAQ PROVISIONAL CONST. (1970), art. 40 (providing that “[t]he president,
vice-president and members of the Revolutionary Command Council shall enjoy com-
plete immunity, and it is prohibited to undertake any process in respect to the right of
any of them without the prior permission of the Council”). THE IRAQI CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 27, at 108.
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it clear that there would be no constitutional bar to the prosecution
of officials for crimes they committed while in office.73
There is an exception to this otherwise absolute bar to immu-
nity from prosecution.  Article 34 prohibits any judicial process,
criminal or civil, for statements made by Members of the National
Assembly while the Assembly is in session.74  It also bars the arrest
or trial of a Member of the Assembly while the Assembly is in ses-
sion, except where a charge is actually pending and the Assembly
waives the immunity, or where the Member is caught in flagrante
delicto.75  It was recognized by the drafters that the immunity, partic-
ularly with respect to statements, was extremely broad.  The intent
of this provision, however, was to provide a wide berth for the Na-
tional Assembly, and to ensure that the courts would not be used to
chill free and open debate.  This exception also existed in the Con-
stitution of 1925.76
The IGC listed the exclusive competencies of the Federal Gov-
ernment in Article 25.77  This Article contained one of the most
73. See CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF IRAQ art. 81 (1925), reprinted in THE
IRAQI CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 27, at 24. It is noteworthy that there was no official
immunity provision in the Constitution of 1925.  Quite the contrary, it contained a
provision that expressly set forth how and by whom officials could be tried for crimes
they committed when they were in office. Id.
74. TAL, supra note 3, art. 34, providing that:
Each member of the National Assembly shall enjoy immunity for statements
made while the Assembly is in session, and the member may not be sued
before the courts for such.  A member may not be placed under arrest dur-
ing a session of the National Assembly, unless the member is accused of a
crime and the National Assembly agrees to lift his immunity or if he is
caught in flagrante delicto in the commission of a felony.
75. Id.
76. See CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF IRAQ art. 60 (1925), reprinted in THE
IRAQI CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 27, at 19.
77. TAL, supra note 3, art. 25, providing that:
The Iraqi Transitional Government shall have exclusive competence in the
following matters:
(A) Formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation; negotiating,
signing, and ratifying international treaties and agreements; formulating
foreign economic and trade policy and sovereign debt policies;
(B) Formulating and executing national security policy, including creating
and maintaining armed forces to secure, protect, and guarantee the secur-
ity of the country’s borders and to defend Iraq;
(C) Formulating fiscal policy, issuing currency, regulating customs, regulat-
ing commercial policy across regional and governorate boundaries in Iraq,
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controversial provisions of the TAL, though most other provisions
were not in dispute.  Clearly, the Federal Government should have
exclusive competence in areas such as foreign policy, defense, fiscal
and monetary policy, customs, commercial policy, establishing and
administrating a central bank, and so on.  But who would control
Iraq’s natural resources?
Though it has others, Iraq’s principal natural resources are oil
and water.  Some members of the IGC believed, probably quite
rightly, that the central government had used oil as a carrot or as a
stick, as circumstances dictated.  For favored governorates, such as
that from which Saddam Hussein hailed, oil revenues flowed far
above demographic needs.  In contrast, development funds
dripped one drop at a time to less-favored governorates, such as
those in the south.  Some members of the IGC, particularly some
Kurdish leaders, in a variation of John Marshall’s adage that the
power to tax was the power to destroy,78 believed that the power to
control oil revenues was the power to destroy.  Having had de facto
independence from Baghdad for twelve years under international
protection, and about to gain constitutional protections for a feder-
ated state, the Kurdish leadership wanted to ensure that Baghdad
could not strangle this new-found arrangement.  They insisted that
Iraq’s regional governments or governorates must own the natural
resources found within their territories, though they agreed that
revenues had to be shared.
drawing up the national budget of the State, formulating monetary policy,
and establishing and administering a central bank;
(D) Regulating weights and measures and formulating a general policy on
wages;
(E) Managing the natural resources of Iraq, which belongs to all the people
of all the regions and governorates of Iraq, in consultation with the govern-
ments of the regions and the administrations of the governorates, and dis-
tributing the revenues resulting from their sale through the national
budget in an equitable manner proportional to the distribution of popula-
tion throughout the country, and with due regard for areas that were un-
justly deprived of these revenues by the previous regime, for dealing with
their situations in a positive way, for their needs, and for the degree of
development of the different areas of the country;
(F) Regulating Iraqi citizenship, immigration, and asylum; and
(G) Regulating telecommunications policy.
78. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819).
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Dr. Pachachi was adamant that control of natural resources be
within the competence of the Federal Government only.  He feared
the potential for civil war if it were otherwise.  Central Iraq has no
oil.  If northern regions and/or governorates controlled their oil
reserves, and if the south did the same, what incentive would the
central region have to cooperate in national re-building?  He also
wondered who would control the water.  Could upstream
governorates claim they had “ownership” of Iraq’s water resources?
For their part, the Shia religious parties were agnostic on the sub-
ject.  A representative of one of the more prominent of these
groups stated that it was in essence of no moment to him how the
issue was resolved, but that he would insist “whatever the Kurds get,
the Shia must get.”79
In the end, Dr. Pachachi’s view prevailed,80 and Article 25(E)
was the result.  Ownership of Iraq’s natural resources was vested in
all the people, but the Federal Government would control distribu-
tion of the funds derived from sale of those resources.81  The distri-
bution of such funds would not be at the unfettered discretion of
the Federal Government, however.  The Government had to take
into account demography, need, and past discriminatory practices
resulting in underdevelopment.
In some of the provisions of Article 25, very fine distinctions
were inevitably drawn.  For example, Article 25(G), originally
drafted by Salem Chalabi, makes regulation of telecommunications
policy the exclusive function of the federal government, but not nec-
essarily regulation of telecommunications as such.82  This distinc-
tion was important because the Kurdistan Regional Government
had regulated its own telecommunications for twelve years.
79. On this issue of the control of natural resources, see DIAMOND, supra note 10,
at 169.  During the negotiations, IGC Member Ahmad Chalabi, through his representa-
tive and nephew, Salem Chalabi, proposed to create a corporation that would own the
natural resources in Iraq.  Under this plan, majority shares in the corporation would be
owned by the Federal Government, while Regional Governments and municipalities
would own the balance.  The author of this article, representing Pahcachi’s view, ar-
gued strongly against the proposal.
80. See id.
81. TAL, supra note 3, art. 25(E).
82. See id. at art. 25(G).
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Article 27 deals broadly with military matters.  Article 27(B) is
meant to outlaw militias.83  One of the most hotly contested provi-
sions in this section was Article 27(E) relating to the non-prolifera-
tion, non-development, non-production, and non-use of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons.84  This section was very impor-
tant to the CPA, which kept proposing a version in which Iraq
would forever renounce these weapons.  This was a problem be-
cause of the unelected nature of the Governing Council, and be-
cause this unelected body was engaged in drafting a transitional
constitution.  A clause forever denouncing these weapons would be
perfectly appropriate — perhaps desirable — in a permanent con-
stitution, if the people’s elected representatives wished to include
one, but Iraq was not yet at this stage.  The final language con-
tained a strong rejection of the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, but couched that renunciation in terms of the limited
duration of the transitional period.85
Chapter Four, entitled the Transitional Legislative Authority,
dealt with the broad parameters of the internal functioning of the
National Assembly.86  One failing of the TAL was that it did not
specify who must call on the members of the National Assembly to
convene for the first time, or what the mechanism for doing so
should be.  Regardless, upon the convening of the Assembly, and
until a presiding officer and two deputies could be elected, the TAL
dictated that the oldest member of the National Assembly would
serve as the pro tempore presiding officer.87  This provision was based
upon the practice in the British House of Commons, where the
longest-serving member, the Father of the House, presides over the
83. See id. at art. 27(B) (providing that “[a]rmed forces and militias not under the
command structure of the Iraqi Transitional Government are prohibited, except as pro-
vided by federal law”).
84. Id. at art. 27(E) (providing that “[t]he Iraqi Transitional Government shall
respect and implement Iraq’s international obligations regarding the non-proliferation,
non-development, non-production, and non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons, and associated equipment, materiel, technologies, and delivery systems for
use in the development, manufacture, production, and use of such weapons”).
85. Id.
86. Id. at arts. 30-33.
87. Id. at art. 32(A) (stating that “[t]he National Assembly shall draw up its own
internal procedures, and it shall sit in public session unless circumstances require oth-
erwise, consistent with its internal procedures.  The first session of the Assembly shall be
chaired by its oldest member”).
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body until a speaker is elected.88  The TAL provided that the Na-
tional Assembly elect its president and two deputies, with the presi-
dent being the “individual who receives the greatest number of
votes for that office; the first deputy president the next highest; and
the second deputy president the next.”89  Once the National Assem-
bly organized itself, one of its first tasks was appointing a Presidency
Council consisting of a president of Iraq and two deputy
presidents.90
The second clause of Article 30(C) was noteworthy because it
required the electoral law to attempt to achieve female representa-
tion equal to one-quarter of the seats in the National Assembly.91
Dr. Pachachi, who was the first IGC member to propose reserving
seats for women, originally proposed a set-aside of forty percent.92
There were, of course, objections to this from other IGC members.
During a meeting of experts, including this author, one representa-
tive of a religious party objected to this set-aside, asserting, “There
are not a hundred women in Iraq who are qualified to sit in the
National Assembly.”  This author responded, “If there are not a
88. House of Commons Info. Office, The Father of the House (2003), available at
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/m03.pdf.
89. TAL, supra note 3, art. 32(B), providing that:
The National Assembly shall elect, from its own members, a president and
two deputy presidents of the National Assembly.  The president of the Na-
tional Assembly shall be the individual who receives the greatest number of
votes for that office; the first deputy president the next highest; and the
second deputy president the next.  The president of the National Assembly
may vote on an issue, but may not participate in the debates, unless he
temporarily steps out of the chair immediately prior to addressing the issue.
90. Id. at art. 36(A) (providing in part, “[t]he National Assembly shall elect a Pres-
ident of the State and two Deputies. They shall form the Presidency Council[.]”)
91. See id. at art. 30(C), providing that:
The National Assembly shall be elected in accordance with an electoral law
and a political parties law.  The electoral law shall aim to achieve the goal of
having women constitute no less than one-quarter of the members of the
National Assembly and of having fair representation for all communities in
Iraq, including the Turcomans, ChaldoAssyrians, and others.
92. See U.N. Comm’n on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
[CEDAW], General Recommendation 23 on Article 7 (Political and Public Life), U.N. GAOR,
52nd Sess., Supp. No. 38, U.N. Doc. A/52/38 (1997) (“Research demonstrates that if
women’s participation reaches 30 to 35 per cent (generally termed a ‘critical mass’),
there is a real impact on political style and the content of decisions, and political life is
revitalized.”).
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hundred qualified women, there certainly are not a hundred and
fifty qualified men.”93
When a similar objection was made during a regular meeting
of the full IGC, one IGC Member responded, “Given what men
have done to Iraq in the last eighty years, maybe we should turn the
whole government over to women and see what they would do.”94
The percentage was changed from forty to twenty-five in order to
reach a compromise.  In fact, women achieved a presence of thirty-
one percent in the National Assembly.95  By contrast, fourteen per-
cent of the members of the U.S. Congress are women.96
Article 33(C) dealt with initiation of the budgetary process.97
Many parliamentary systems are bicameral and generally legislation
dealing with finance must originate in the lower of the two houses.
Because Iraq, for the time at least, has a unicameral system, Article
33(C) reversed this situation and required all finance bills to origi-
nate from the Council of Ministers.  Presumably there will be only
one budget during this transitional period.  The National Assembly
had the right to reallocate proposed spending and reduce the total
amount in the general budget, but it could not unilaterally increase
the budget.  Only the Council of Ministers was empowered to pro-
pose increases in spending, because of a concern about what in Iraq
93. The placeholder for the size of the Assembly was initially 250 members.
94. The author was present at the IGC meeting when this exchange took place.
95. Dep’t. State Fact Sheet, Office of the Senior Coordinator for International
Women’s Issues, Int’l Information Programs, United States Committed to Helping
Women in Iraq, (June 22, 2005), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/
2005/Jun/24-979928.html (This was a significant step toward reaching CEDAW’s goal
of “50/50 gender distribution.”). See U.N. Comm’n on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion against Women, General Recommendation No. 25 on article 4, paragraph 1, of the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, on temporary special
measures, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 38, U.N. Doc. A/58/38 (1997) at 1113
(2004), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/
index.html.
96. Madeleine Kunin, Op-Ed., US Women Lag in Elected Office, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
May 31, 2004, at A11.
97. See TAL, supra note 3, art. 33(C), providing that:
Only the Council of Ministers shall have the right to present a proposed
national budget.  The National Assembly has the right to reallocate pro-
posed spending and to reduce the total amounts in the general budget.  It
also has the right to propose an increase in the overall amount of expendi-
tures to the Council of Ministers if necessary.
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would have to be called “lamb barrel,” rather than “pork barrel”
politics.
Chapter Five, the Transitional Executive Authority, outlines
the responsibilities of the Presidency Council, the Prime Minister,
and the Council of Ministers.98  After the National Assembly ap-
points the Presidency Council, the Council has two weeks in which
to unanimously appoint a Prime Minister.  If it fails to do so, then
the right to appoint the Prime Minister reverts to the National As-
sembly, which must do so by a two-thirds vote.  The Prime Minister
then recommends candidates for appointment to a Council of Min-
isters over which he is to preside, though the ministers are formally
appointed by the Presidency Council.99
In order to start their work as a government, the Prime Minis-
ter and the Council of Ministers must receive a majority vote of
confidence from the National Assembly.100  The National Assembly
has the right to withdraw its confidence in the Prime Minister, the
Council of Ministers as a whole, or any particular minister.101  In
this sense the Transitional Government appears, at first blush, to be
98. See id. at arts. 35-42.
99. Id. at art. 38, providing that:
(A) The Presidency Council shall name a Prime Minister unanimously, as
well as the members of the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation
of the Prime Minister.  The Prime Minister and Council of Ministers shall
then seek to obtain a vote of confidence by simple majority from the Na-
tional Assembly prior to commencing their work as a government.  The
Presidency Council must agree on a candidate for the post of Prime Minis-
ter within two weeks.  In the event that it fails to do so, the responsibility of
naming the Prime Minister reverts to the National Assembly.  In that event,
the National Assembly must confirm the nomination by a two-thirds major-
ity.  If the Prime Minister is unable to nominate his Council of Ministers
within one month, the Presidency Council shall name another Prime
Minister.
(B)The qualifications for Prime Minister must be the same as for the mem-
bers of the Presidency Council except that his age must not be less than 35
years upon his taking office.
100. Id. at art. 38(A) & 40(A).
101. Id. at art. 40(A), stating that:
The Prime Minister and the ministers shall be responsible before the Na-
tional Assembly, and this Assembly shall have the right to withdraw its confi-
dence either in the Prime Minister or in the ministers collectively or
individually.  In the event that confidence in the Prime Minister is with-
drawn, the entire Council of Ministers shall be dissolved, and Article 40(B),
below, shall become operative.
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a parliamentary system; however, there is an important distinction
between Iraq’s system and a true parliamentary system.  If any mem-
ber of the National Assembly is appointed to the Council of Minis-
ters, he must resign from the Assembly.102  Thus, the TAL does not
create a true parliamentary system, but a semi-parliamentary one.
While ministers and the entire government serve at the pleasure of
parliament, there is complete separation of powers between the
Legislature and the Executive authorities.  Members of the military
are barred from serving in any political office unless the individual
has resigned or retired from duty eighteen months prior to
serving.103
There was very little debate in the IGC about the principle of
judicial independence enshrined in Chapter Six, entitled The Fed-
eral Judicial Authority.104  For the first time in Iraq’s history, the
independence of the judiciary is constitutionally protected.  In the
last days of the monarchy, Parliament passed a statute that estab-
lished the independence of the judiciary in Iraq, but this protection
did not rise to the level of constitutional protection.  Great Britain
had been the mandatory power in Iraq, and it did not have a tradi-
tion of independence of the judiciary, in a theoretical sense at least.
After all, the House of Lords continues to be the court of last resort
in Britain.
As a result of that history, Iraq did not have a constitutionally
independent judiciary.  In fact, until the TAL was promulgated, all
regular judges were employed by the Ministry of Justice.  Beginning
with the overthrow of the monarchy, over the next forty-five years,
Iraqis became inured to a system of “courts,” including military
courts, trying civilians, as well as other exceptional courts, such as
102. Id. at art. 28(A), providing that:
Members of the National Assembly; the Presidency Council; the Council of
Ministers, including the Prime Minister; and judges and justices of the
courts may not be appointed to any other position in or out of government.
Any member of the National Assembly who becomes a member of the Presi-
dency Council or Council of Ministers shall be deemed to have resigned his
membership in the National Assembly.
103. Id. at art. 28(B) (stating that, “[i]n no event may a member of the armed
forces be a member of the National Assembly, minister, Prime Minister, or member of
the Presidency Council unless the individual has resigned his commission or rank, or
retired from duty at least eighteen months prior to serving”).
104. See id. at arts. 43-47.
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“revolutionary” courts.  All of this judicial (or extra-judicial) activity
occurred without the power of judicial review.  Accordingly, Article
44 established a constitutional court, the Supreme Federal Court,
which has the right of judicial review.105  It is an interesting histori-
cal fact that objections to judicial review were expressed by a repre-
sentative of the CPA, who, closely mirroring the liberal/
conservative divide in the United States, feared that the courts
would begin to exercise too much power in Iraq.
Chapter Nine sets forth the procedures for drafting a perma-
nent constitution.106  Once the Transitional Government is in
place, the TAL requires the National Assembly draft a permanent
105. Id. at art. 44, stating that:
(A) A court called the Federal Supreme Court shall be constituted by law in
Iraq.
(B) The jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court shall be as follows:
(1) Original and exclusive jurisdiction in legal proceedings between the
Iraqi Transitional Government and the regional governments,
governorate and municipal administrations, and local administrations.
(2) Original and exclusive jurisdiction, on the basis of a complaint from
a claimant or a referral from another court, to review claims that a law,
regulation, or directive issued by the federal or regional governments,
the governorate or municipal administrations, or local administrations is
inconsistent with this Law.
(3) Ordinary appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court shall
be defined by federal law.
(C) Should the Federal Supreme Court rule that a challenged law, regula-
tion, directive, or measure is inconsistent with this Law, it shall be deemed
null and void.
(D) The Federal Supreme Court shall create and publish regulations re-
garding the procedures required to bring claims and to permit attorneys to
practice before it.  It shall take its decisions by simple majority, except deci-
sions with regard to the proceedings stipulated in Article 44(B)(1), which
must be by a two-thirds majority.  Decisions shall be binding.  The Court
shall have full powers to enforce its decisions, including the power to issue
citations for contempt of court and the measures that flow from this.
(E) The Federal Supreme Court shall consist of nine members.  The
Higher Juridical Council shall, in consultation with the regional judicial
councils, initially nominate no less than eighteen and up to twenty-seven
individuals to fill the initial vacancies in the aforementioned Court.  It will
follow the same procedure thereafter, nominating three members for each
subsequent vacancy that occurs by reason of death, resignation, or removal.
The Presidency Council shall appoint the members of this Court and name
one of them as its Presiding Judge.  In the event an appointment is re-
jected, the Higher Juridical Council shall nominate a new group of three
candidates.
106. See id. at arts. 50-62.
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constitution.107  While the CPA had intended to appoint an assem-
bly to draft the constitution through a caucus system, the Grand
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the leading Shiite cleric in Iraq, issued a
fatwa, or judgment under Islamic law, holding that only an elected
body could draft a permanent constitution.108  Agreement with this
position was widespread, for more than just religious grounds.
Given that an elected assembly passed Iraq’s constitution eighty
years earlier,109 it was hard to justify an unelected assembly writing
the new constitution.  It was an interesting confluence of a religious
scholar’s fatwa and the views of many liberals that helped ensure
that an elected assembly would be the body to draft the permanent
constitution.
The necessity of having the permanent constitution drafted
only by an elected body raised a question of why the TAL should
bind the National Assembly.  After all, the TAL is a transitional doc-
ument, drafted by an unelected body, and is thus of limited legiti-
macy.  The National Assembly would have much greater legitimacy
by virtue of it being elected.  Why is the Transitional Government
not free, then, to disregard the TAL?
The answer is probably more political than legal.  The TAL was
drafted by a group of responsible men and women who all agreed
that Iraq had been lawless for too long and needed to develop the
institutions of the rule of law.  These individuals consisted largely of
the same men and women now in the National Assembly, represent-
ing the same parties.  Most of these individuals understood very well
that they would impair their own credibility if on March 8, 2004,
they bound themselves to a document and then on March 1, 2005,
they refused to abide by it.  Most, if not all of the parties, under-
stood that to renounce this document would return Iraqis to the
days of Saddam Hussein and his well-known saying, “what, after all,
107. See id. at art. 60, providing:
The National Assembly shall write a draft of the permanent constitution of
Iraq.  This Assembly shall carry out this responsibility in part by encourag-
ing debate on the constitution through regular general public meetings in
all parts of Iraq and through the media, and receiving proposals from the
citizens of Iraq as it writes the constitution.
108. DAVID L. PHILLIPS, LOSING IRAQ:  INSIDE THE POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION FIASCO
178 (2005).
109. See IRELAND, supra note 1, at 393.
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is the law?  I can change it with a stroke of the pen.”110  Iraq’s politi-
cians understood that Iraqis want to leave those days behind.  The
ultimate goal was to emerge from the transitional period with a
fully legitimate government.  The TAL was simply a vehicle to get
Iraq to that goal on a sound legal footing.111
Assuming the National Assembly decided to continue to oper-
ate under the auspices of the TAL (it has done so to date), it has
complete discretion in how to draft the permanent constitution.  If
it had chosen to do so, all 275 members could have participated in
the drafting.  Because the members of the National Assembly were
elected, it was entirely within their discretion to decide how to pro-
ceed, and this provision was left deliberately vague.  It was left to
them, for instance, to decide whether to form a constitutional com-
mittee consisting of people within as well as outside the assembly,
operating under the supervision of the National Assembly.112
In the process of supervising and producing a draft constitu-
tion, the National Assembly is obligated to consult with and engage
the people of Iraq in a dialogue about the document.113  By August
15, 2005, there must be a complete text.114  The TAL permits a one-
time extension of six months to produce the document.115  The
110. This was a statement Saddam Hussein once made on national television.  It is
widely known amongst Iraqis.
111. See TAL, supra note 3, art. 3(A).  If the National Assembly is sufficiently dissat-
isfied with a provision of the TAL, it has the option of passing an amendment.  As with
any constitution, amending the TAL would be difficult.  An amendment would require
a three fourths vote of the National Assembly plus the unanimous support of the Presi-
dency Council. Id.
112. See Perry, et al., Talabani hopes to beat Iraq constitution deadline: Draft document
due by Monday, CNN.com, (Aug. 13, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/
meast/08/13/iraq.main/index.html.  As it turned out, this was precisely how the Na-
tional Assembly proceeded.  A Constitutional Committee consisting of Assembly Mem-
bers and individuals outside the Assembly was tasked with drafting the document.  It
was then to report the proposed draft to the National Assembly for debate.
113. See TAL, supra note 3, art. 60 (providing that “[t]his Assembly shall carry out
this responsibility in part by encouraging debate on the constitution through regular
general public meetings in all parts of Iraq and through the media, and receiving pro-
posals from the citizens of Iraq as it writes the constitution”).
114. Id. at art. 61(A) (providing that “[t]he National Assembly shall write the draft
of the permanent constitution by no later than 15 August 2005”).
115. Id. at art. 61(F), stating that:
If necessary, the president of the National Assembly, with the agreement of
a majority of the members’ votes, may certify to the Presidency Council no
later than 1 August 2005 that there is a need for additional time to com-
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president of the Assembly may certify the need for an extension to
produce a text, but he must do so to the Presidency Council no
later than August 1, 2005.116  In the absence of an extension, a ref-
erendum on the proposed draft must be held by October 15,
2005.117  If the proposed constitution is rejected by a two-thirds vote
in any three governorates, the text is rejected.118
If the proposed constitution is passed by the referendum, the
next elections are to be held no later than December 15, 2005, for a
government pursuant to the permanent constitution.  That govern-
ment is to take office by December 31, 2005.119  In the event that
the text is rejected by the October 15th referendum, elections for a
new National Assembly must be held no later than December 15th
and the new National Assembly will then be charged with produc-
ing another draft permanent constitution.120
In the debates over the permanent constitution, all issues are
open.  Debates on the nature of federalism, the role of religion,
and the rights of women, are all likely to recur.  Aside from proce-
plete the writing of the draft constitution.  The Presidency Council shall
then extend the deadline for writing the draft constitution for only six
months.  This deadline may not be extended again.
116. Id.
117. Id. at art. 61(B), providing that:
The draft permanent constitution shall be presented to the Iraqi people for
approval in a general referendum to be held no later than 15 October
2005.  In the period leading up to the referendum, the draft constitution
shall be published and widely distributed to encourage a public debate
about it among the people.
118. Id. at art. 61(C) (stating that “[t]he general referendum will be successful and
the draft constitution ratified if a majority of the voters in Iraq approve and if two-thirds
of the voters in three or more governorates do not reject it”).
119. Id. at art. 61(D) (providing that “[i]f the permanent constitution is approved
in the referendum, elections for a permanent government shall be held no later than
15 December 2005 and the new government shall assume office no later than 31 De-
cember 2005”).
120. Id. at art. 61(E), stating that:
If the referendum rejects the draft permanent constitution, the National
Assembly shall be dissolved.  Elections for a new National Assembly shall be
held no later than 15 December 2005.  The new National Assembly and
new Iraqi Transitional Government shall then assume office no later than
31 December 2005, and shall continue to operate under this Law, except
that the final deadlines for preparing a new draft may be changed to make
it possible to draft a permanent constitution within a period not to exceed
one year.  The new National Assembly shall be entrusted with writing an-
other draft permanent constitution.
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dural requirements, no substantive provision of the TAL binds the
National Assembly in its drafting of the permanent constitution,
though many of the framers of the TAL hope that it will be the
template for the permanent constitution.  There are others who
hope the TAL will be ignored entirely in the drafting of the perma-
nent constitution.  How things will transpire is unclear, but however
they do, it will have been the people’s elected representatives who
steer the course.
In the months leading up to the January 30th elections, issues
often debated included: Whether the elections would be regarded
as legitimate; whether and how many people were going to partici-
pate in the elections and formation of the government; who the
personalities constituting the government would be; and what
would the new Iraqi constitution look like.  Given Iraq’s history over
the past thirty-five years, it was no small feat that a reasonably free
election took place, one whose results were not known until after
the votes were counted.  There have been many positive develop-
ments in the country, though there have also been profound
problems.  Despite these ongoing problems, this remains a truly
hopeful moment for Iraq, a moment in which the people have re-
claimed the rule of law in the land whence the concept itself
originated.
